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The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-examined 
s Ar;..P- \qt,� 
Friedrich Sol:msen 
Among students of Greek philosophy there is al.most complete unanimity· 
regarding the tenets upheld by Zeno of' Elea and the purpose of his treatise 
as a whole. Although by no means abundant, the verbatim fragments, the 
second-hand reports about his arguments, and the statements defining his 
philosophical intention are considered an adequate basis for definite 
conclusions. The paper hereby submitted does not aim at replacing one 
theory by another but has the more modest objective of examining the 
eVidence on which the communis opinio so confidently rests and to show how 
.much has been too readily accepted as certain . We shall begin with 
questions and shall end up not with positive answers but with other questions. 
Every comprehensive treatment of Ze.,no uses as starting point the dis-
cussion between Socrates and Zeno at the beginning of Plato's Pe.rme.l'lides 
(127d6-128e4). This well known section informs us that Zeno wrote his 
treatise in defense of Pannenides' thesis and wrote it against the 11de­
tractorst1 of Parmenides. The master had proved EV Er va 4 the faithful 
disciple supported him by proving in each of his arguments (or bY;oo,the.§.ej.§.) 
wb 0 U}(. E O .. t' I, no A.A.a ( ib. 127e9f.; 12Sa8ff 0). 
Plato must know: consensus on this point seems so general that it is 
almost a sacrilege to question the validity of his "statement11-at least 
of its substance; some details are readily dismissed. Plato, it seems to 
be held, was in a position to form a judgment and had no reason for deceiving 
his readers; moreover, as Hermann Frankel has argued, the mixture of jest 
and $eriousness characteristic of Zeno us reasoning was particularly congenial 
to Plato; therefore he, if anyone, would be in an excellent position to 
understand Zeno's subtle playfulness. Vlastos and Guthrie refuse to find 
in Zeno the specific kind of humor which Frankel has noticed; it may also 
be asked whether Plato's own humor was not of a more gentle and amiable kind 
• 
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-asteign. Still in principle Frankel's argument, based as it is on 
congeniality of temperaments, has more to be said for it than the approach 
of others who without a moment's hesitation credit Plato with interests 
typical of' a modern historian of philosophy. Yet what Plato in his dialogues 
reports a.bout his philosophical precursors is almost invariably determined 
. . 
by the specific problem and context for which he refers to them. How one-
sided, not to say distorted, would be the impression which the dialogues 
roughly contemporary with the Parmenides would give us of Heraclitus: mnta 
rhei. would appear to be the es sence of his philosophyo Dealing with 
Parmenides or the Eleatics as a group, Plato in accordance with the trend 
of his own argument , treats on some occasions the "one," on others "being" 
and the rejection of' "non-being," on still others the "immovable" qua.lity 
of the "one" as the essence of their philosophy (�. 12Sa.ff . ; Sopl!• 242d; 
237arr.; Theaet. 180e). Further illustrations would be available but it 
may suffice to say that Plato's attitude to earlier thinkers is that of a 
productive philosopher who finds in his precursors whatever suits his own 
thought, not at all that of a philological and historical interpre�ere 
Returning to our section in the Parmenides we may notice some unique 
features$ This time Plato makes as clear as we could wish that Socrates 
arrives at his conclustons by a process of inference. He proceeds 
122detemntim; the steps, i.e. the individual hypotheses, each of them 
resting on the preceding, are clearly marked (127e4, the .first, would 
hardly be disputed; e8-10; 10-1.3; 128a.6-bl0),. Are we then tc suppose that 
Plato had il'i careful philological analysis formed an opinion about the 
meaning and purpose of Zeno's work and now uses a peculiar and ingenious 
device to communicate this opinion to his readers·? Socrates inquires of 
Zeno whether the inference s  are correct and Zeno replies by giving an 
authoritative confirmation,. Even granting the truth of these assumptions, 
. . . there would still remain the possibj.li ty of an error on Plato's ?art .. 
However I have spoken of a device and may thereby approx:i:mate the position 
of' N., B., Booth,· who_ (Phronesis 3, 1957, 2) refers to Parmenides and Zeno 
in this dialogue as "idealized characters," urging us "not to ignore 
(Plato's) dramatic and philosophical purposes .. " On this point. I should 
agree with him and shall indeed return to the question of Plato's purpose .. 
For a while, however, I wish to proceed along different lines .. .As we have 
s�en, what Plato says about Zeno's t::reatise and its purpose is close'.cy' 
l"elated to a corresponding account of Pa:rrnenides; the two summ.aries pre-
. suppose and support one another. Now fro:m. the fragments of Parmenides v.re 
are in a position to form an independent judgment a.bout his "thesis." Did 
he actually write to prove (as Socrates says, he did "beautifully and 'W'elltt 
12Sb) EV e I. \l(XI, i;6 1tCXV' and is this 8.S Plato makes Parmenides himselr 
say (l.37b.3) his hYR6tb,esi.s? Far from it, and Plato himself, when it suits 
his book, i.e. his argument, knows better.. Pamer.cl.des established the 
reality and indeed the monopoly o:t Being, 't'O t6v� and showed that the only 
true road lead_s to W� ed't'LV (B4, 6, 8)0 Having set up Being in its new 
and unhea:rd-,of glory1 he described the sem.ata on the true road (B8.2ff .. ) , 
providing Being with its essential characteristics.. One of' them is indeed 
hen (BS.6) another probably (if this is the correct read:!.ng at B8.4) 
mounoge!l!!, but -rteither of' them occupies a privileged posHion among the 
attributes of Being.. hen, placed as it is before syn.aches, is likely to 
designate intrinsic unity; if this is the case, only �punogsinJU;!. would 
indicate uniqueness,. Certainly, uniqueness is no more emphasized than 
say ageneton, �llQlethron11 oulon, atremes (l3Se3f'.,) and more other attributes 
· qf Being than it is convenient here to enumerate., 
Thus Plato seems to misrepresent Parmenides i doctrine., Still there 
may be another facet to the story.. If Parme1udes � recognized Being, 
the "only" may for the next generation of' Eleatics have become as important 
as, and in particular more problematic than, Being., There is some 
evi\'.1ence that the issue shifted� 'When Empedocles (to say·nothing here 
of Anaxagoras 'an.d Leucippus) transferred some characteristics of 
Parmenides' Being to his six eternal entities, he in effect gave up the 
. . . 
hen., h!n or �' rather than Being or not-Being, Being or Beeond.ng 
. 
may have been the most eagerly debated question of that· tiTIJ:e.. Also no 
:matter whether Plato knew or merely assumed the existence of people 'Who 
. ridiculed Parmenides' philosophy . (Parm.. 12Sc7ff .. ) , it is· intrinsically 
probable that the-b!!. provoked most attacks-not because of :its actual 
place in the poem but because co:mmon sense would inev.i. tably be most 
offended by the claims of a monolithic Being ·which allowed no reality for 
the innumerable objects of ordinary human experience,, Defenders of Par-
menides may have found some of their weapons in his ow poem by putting 
. ' . . . . . 
new and stronger accents on what they particularly needed, i .,e,, perhaps 
not only on hrul and p;ounogene§ but also on his injunction against a:n;r 
new gigpes_!.hai (BS.12)� on the .'e!n homoion (1J2<ll 22f'.,)jl and especially, 
onewould·think9 ·on his emphatic protest against t'W'o m.orOOiU which h'U1'.!W.Il 
opinion erroneously posits (S .. 53f)., There is indeed monism in his thou.ght, 
whether we consider it latent and implied or ope11ly preser.1t,. It is close 
to bis "thesis" but it is not the actual thesis,,. Melissus, who of 
Parmenides' more orthodox followers is best known to us, still has to 
!.Qll as his subject (see Bl-4 but also B7i> correc·�ly understoodh in B7 
. . 
� is a predicate of it and as such on the sru11e level as three others 
(see 7 .. 1); however in B5 and B6 the necessity of' p�;n (still as an attribute 
of Being) is established, and in B7 hen (as such?) is upheld against a 
·rival philosophy cha:mpioning �::>l+,40 Quite definitely the �!! is making 
progress., 
Melissus, it should be clearly understoodj does not prove that the 
t\ 
,, 
thesis EV E<J't"L.V had succeeded Parmenides• own €:0't1.v , but in com-
• 
5 
bination with the other evidence he allows us to believe that the most 
acute Eleatic problem of his generation was the alternative: film or polla. 
If we see Zeno in this perspective, he may indeed have defended Parmenides 
but not so much the authentic Parmenides as rather Parmenides' philosophy 
in the shape which it had taken for thinkers of the next generation. This 
. essential qualification is, as far as Ji know, never made by the scholars 
who take their stand on Plato 1 s testimony for Zeno's treatise, nor, what 
is more important, is it made by Plato himself. For him Parmenides "says 
hen" (12Sb.3, dl etc. ) or €.v -r6 nCiv (128a8). It remains true that to 
ascribe this doctrine to the historical Parmenides is to get his thought 
out of f OCUS. 
Another assertion of Plato, scil. the 'ta:u-rov A.tyE 1, v of Parmenides 
and Zeno {l28a5, b5; implicite b7ff . ) is so closely tied to the statements 
about Parmenides' hen that it cannot survive as historically valid if the 
hen is found to be invalid. 
Again Plato says that all of Zeno's arguments were designed to refute 
the polla (127e9ff., 128blf., d;2ff. ) . As we have seen, this t estimony 
could be correct even if Parmenides' own position is incorrectly stated 
by Plato. Yet on other grounds there is room for doubt. Although the 
modern interpreters of Zeno are at one in accepting Plato ' s testimony, 
when it comes to applying the testimony to the more specific evidence they 
are less unanimous, and not all make a great effort to have it constantly 
in mind. For some it seems to suffice if Zeno's arguments ultimately do 
away with the "many"; in spite of what Plato affirms not every individual 
argument must have the "many" for its ta rget . Others regard Plato's 
statement as literally true and in their inte�pretation show that with 
the necessary ingenuity it is possible to find the hypothesis of the 
"many" everywhere, even in the arguments against motion, refuted. Still 
• 6 
the prior question may be whether this ingenuity is called for. We do 
not know Zeno's own wording of the arguments against movement; what 
Aristotle (�. VI 9) reports about them wo uld allow us--in fact make 
it more natural-to regard movement, not the many as the refutand. In 
the Parrnenides, (if we are ready at all to look at the testimony with 
critical eyes ) we may notice that the step from� argument of Zeno 
which is fatal to "the many" to !!;J. arguments is taken very fast (127e6-10; 
cf� el0-128al) . Moreover�and now we are returning to the subject of 
Plato's purpose--he has a strong interest of his own in the relation 
between ( the ) one and (the) many. Beginning with the Euthyphron am Menon 
and ending with the Laws this problem engages him agai n and again; it 
arises both between Forms and particulars and in the realm of Forms 
themselves and has fully deserved the description in the Philebus (15d7) 
as �WV A6ywv au�wv &�ava�6v �L Kat ay�pwv na�o� EV nµtv. 
In the latter parts of the Parmenides we follow with bewilderment Plato's 
experimentation with a great variety of hypot heses concerning the One 
and the many. Although his interest in these concepts antedates his 
acdeptance of the Eleatic ontology, he evidently-and with some right--
considered it an Eleatic theme, and probably wrote the Parmenides to 
clarify his own attitude to the alternative "One or many," just as in 
other dialogues of this period he investigates the Eleatic alternative 
of Being and non-Being, Rest and Movement . If this was his intention� 
i.e. the "purpose" which we have been urged not to forget-it would be 
artificial to separate the emphasis on "One" and "ma.ey11 in the initial 
section from the later developments of the dialogue. For in doing so we 
should sever what Plato himself ( 135ef . )  connacts. 
There remains the most important item of Plato's testimony, his 
description of Zeno's purpose in writing the treat ise . Can this survive 
I 
I 
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if so much that is closely connected lid.th it and leads up to it has 
become problematic? Perhaps it can, although in addition to the suspici ons 
already formulated we ought to consider 1) that Plato embeds this description 
in a framework of biographical detail worthy of a Hermippus, which is 
generally discounted and could hardly strengthen our confidence, 2) that 
as a historian of philosophy Plato qualifies not much better than Aristotle, 
3) that the impression he hims elf gives in Phaedrus 26lb-d ( esp. d6-8)--a 
passage on which we shall comment later� of Zen o ' s standing and work is 
rather different from that of the Pannenides and 4) finally that Socrates 
emphasizes how difficult it is to discover Zeno's intention and finds Zeno 
agreeing on this point, although he insists on the accidental, not c1eliberate 
nature of this difficulty ( 128bf . ) . In spite of all these hesitations, 
. 
Plato's diagnosis may be correct9 Zeno even if not directing all his 
arguments against the "many" may have treated movement and other topics 
in a manner intended ultimately to bear out Parmenides. Still, if this 
is the case, Plato ' s testimony would no longer rest exclusively and primarily 
on the support he himself provides for it, qualifications and clarifications 
would be needed which as far as I am aware no current account of Zeno includes, 
and we would altogether find ourselves no longer dealing �nth certainties 
and established facts but with possibilities car:able of more than one 
interpretation. Having said th.is much we are i:erhaps expected to suggest 
an alternative explanation of Zeno ' s  purpose. For strategic reasons we 
prefer to postpone such alternative suggestions-uhich needless to say, 
would likewise be no more than possibilities.Still one assertion may be 
ventured even now. There was something puzzling or bewildering abot.-rt Zeno's 
treatise; many, if not most , readers were at thej.r w:l. ts 1 end, not knowing 
what it all meant. We have seen Socrates and Zeno in essence agreeing on 
this point, and even someone skeptical of other statements in this section 
I ! 
;' '-(·· 
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may have conficence in this because if Zeno's intention had been plain 
and obvious for every reader, Socrates' elaborate inference, his building 
of hypothesis upon hypothesis would be a waste of time an:'l effort. 
But is the testimony of the Parmenides not confirmed by other phases 
of the ancient tradition about Zeno, and in partjcular by the verbatim 
quotations from Zeno's t:i;eatise which Simplicius has preserved in his 
commentary on Aristotle's Physics? These verbatim quotations are the 
most valuable evidence that we have and there is no denying that in two 
of them we find Zeno doing exact ly what Plato leads us to expect of h:i.m: 
he assumes the existence of J22ll!! and shows that this assumption entails 
mutually contradictory results. So far the statements of the Parmenides 
are indeed borne out. The agreement between Plato 1 s "testimonytt in t.he 
Parmenides and these fragments preserved in Simplicius has probably done 
much to strengthen the confidence in the former. Yet Simplicius, besides 
having to offer passages of Zeno's treatise in their original wording, 
also professes to know the content of the entire treatise ar:rl the intention 
in which it was written. This knowledge enables him more than once to 
pronounce on controverdal interpretations of Zeno's arguments . What 
Simplicius knows about the treatise is again in c omplete accord with 
the Parmenides. The agreement could not be closer, but its very closeness 
is bound to create suspicion, and the suspicion turns into conviction as 
soon as we place Simplicius' testimony (29A23 D.-K. =in Aristotelis 
Physica 134,3ff .) side by side with that of the Platonic Parrnenides: 
Plato: 
�O�L 6t �6 YE &An&�, �o�&£Ld 
�L' �au�a [�a ypdµµa�a] �� 
DapµEvC6ou Ady� npo, �ou� 
EnLXELpouv�a, au�ov xwµ�6Etv 
t ' " ' ' w, EL EV EO�L, noAA& KaL 
YEAota ouµ�aCVEL naOXELV �� 
Simplicius: 
£vCou� 'notv &µ�o�tpoL' lv5ovvaL 
�or, A6yoL, �Q �£ £Lp�µ£v� �OU 
TiapµEvC6ou xat �� �oa Z�vwvo,, 
&, aon&Etv i�o6AE�O �Q DapµEvC6ou 
Ady� npo' �ou, £nLX£Lpovv�a� 
au�ov xwµ�oErv w� El EV Eu�� 
A6y� xat lvav-rCa 
av'tLAEY£L 6� ODV 
ypaµµa 1tpoi; -rout; 
q -O:U'ttp. 
i;oui;o 'tO 
-ra 1tOAAa 
AEyov'tat;, xat &vi;ano6C6woL 
i;au'ta xat 1tA£Cw, i;ou i; o  
60UA6µevov OT]AOUV, Wt; e'tL 
Y£AOL6't£pa na oxoL &v aui;wv 
n un63EOLt;, E[ 1t0AAa �O'tLV, 
A t  . - n  7 11 � n 'tOU EV ELVaL, EL 'tLt; 
t - , J:' c LKCXVWt; £1te:..,, OL • 
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1tOAAa xat YEAora cruµ�aCv£L 
AEY£LV i;� A6yi.p xat lvav-rCa 
, _ s: ... , Z' t tt <XU'ttp, u£L�VUt; 0 nvwv W� £'tL 
Y£AOL6't£pa naaxoL av au-rwv n 
U'Jt6&£0L<; n A£youoa 1tOAAa 
EO'tLV �1t£p n 'tOU EV elvaL, 
Surely, as soon as we compare the two passages, an independent opinion 
on the part of Simplicius is out of the question. The extreme similarity 
of the two testimonies allows only one explanation, and we would arrive 
at this even if Simplicius did not himself supply it in the immediately 
following sentence, which Diels unfortunately failed to includ e in the 
testimony 29A23 (and which as far as I can see, nobody else has added to 
the body of evidence that Diels had collected). The sentence states quite 
simply: 1r<xvi;a yap aui;oi; o ZT)vwv t v i;� TIA.ai;wvot; flapµe: v C 6ri 
i 
The Zeno of Plato's Parmenides and the 
historical Zeno are for Simplicius identical, and the combination of "Zeno 
himself" 'With the "divine Plato" (a.a the Neoplatonists like to call him) 
would for him suffice to settle the issue. For us the testimony of the 
Parmenides has no longer the authority which puts it beyond and above all 
controversy. Simplicius' ready acceptance of it ought to be borne in 
mind by students of Zeno, not because the testimony A23 itself has had 
an undue influence on modern views of Zeno, but because Si:mplicius has 
preserved the most important fragments, and thus it bec omes imperative 
for us to consider carefully whether the over-all conception of the treatise 
to which he has committed himself did not guide him in the selection and 
exegesis of these fragments or indeed even in their presentation. He may 
·have shortened some arguments, omitted significant links and mini:mized 
material that his conviction allowed him to treat as irrelevant or 
unintelligible. To come to grips with these problenis, we shall study a 
erucial section of his commentary on the Physics in which be finds it 
neeessa.1"1 tode:f'end his theory(= Plato's hypothesis) about Zeno's 
. . 
· .  purpose against alternative views; for pace H. D. P. Lee (Zeno of Elea, 
. Cemibrid�, 19.36, 7), there were alternative views. OU:r readers will 
tind on the next page the Greek text of this section; Arabic figures at 
the end of individual sentences refer to the conunents by which I have 
tried to explain immediately afterwards the. rather battling manoeuvres 
of Simpllcius, his curious backing and filling. One of our leading 
authorities on Zeno (Hem,, Frankel) has called the passage "confused," 
. another (Vlastos) speaks of "cl'lllllSiness'' but since neither the one nor 
the other quality is typical of Simplicius• work as commentator, he 
must have found himself' in a particularly embarrassing situation. Con­
tusion, even if Simplicius himself' is innocent of it, may yet be the 
state or mind in which the reader finds himse1r 'when melci� his first 
acquaintance with the section (if I am mistaken in this supposition I 
should like to be set right). Our comments may go some way to alleviate 
the bewilderment. Fortunately Simplicius• verbatim quotations here and 
slightly later enable us to reconstruct most or Zeno's original text. 
We shall after explaining as well as we can Si:mplicius' contorted reasoning, 
look at this reconstruction and consider how far we must emancipate our-
selves from Simplicius' presentation if we wish to understand the purport 
·or �eno•s argument. Simplicius is here, as on other occasions, engaged 
in a polemic against Alexander of Aphrodisias' oonnnentaJ:'Y' on Aristotle's 
Fbxsiqs, and elsewhere too he traces Alexander's opinion back to the 
fht@ios of Aristotle's immediate pupil Eudemus of Rhodes. 
. . ·'"· :·�. ····".' 
, �';. -:.r,;'1g/.::J�H::i�i.$;:.:k�'.· i,_,_,_, ·.,· · 
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Simplicius lJS.29�139.19 
'AAA' EOLKEV ano 't'WV Euonµou A6ywv 6 'AAE�avopo<; o6�av 
nEpt 't'OU Znvwvo<; Aa�ELV w<; &vaLpOUV'tO<; 't'O Ev· AEYEL yap 
6 Euof)µo<; f:.v i;o!<; <PuoLxori; 11&pa oov i;ou'to µ£v oux eoi;Lv, 
EO't'L 6£ 'tL ev; 't'OU't'O yap �nopEL'tO. xat Znvwva �aOLV AEyELV, 
EL 't'L<; avi;� i;o £v 6:no6oCn i;C noi;£ loi;Lv, s�ELV i;a ovi;a 
AEyELV.(1) �ndpEL OE wt; EOLHE OLa 'tO 't'WV µE:v alo&T')'t'WV �KaO't'OV 
xai;T')yopLxwi; 't'E noAAa AEyEo&aL xat µEpLoµ�, i;nv 0£ oi;Lyµ�v 
µT')&EV 'tL&EVaL. 0 yap µni;E 7tpOO'tL&EµEVOV aU�EL µni;E a�aLpou­
µEvOV µE�ot, oux �Ei;o i;wv ovi;wv ElvaL".(2) xat Elxo<; µ£v 
�v 't'OV Znvwva w<; f:.�' EKcX't'Epa yuµvaO't'LKW<; EnLXELpOUV't'a (oLO 
xat 'aµ�oi;EpdyAwooo<;' AEyE't'aL) xat 't'OLoui;our; EK�EPELV A6your; 
nEpt i;ou £voe; 6:nopouv-r;cx•(3) f:.v µ£vi;oL -r<t> ouyypaµµai;L o:u-rov 
.L ,, ' , � ' ti s::.. , ti -1tOAAu EXOV't'L £1tLXELpT)µai;o; xav EKO:O'tOV vELKVUOLV, O't'L 't'� 
noAAa £lvaL AEyov-r;L ouµ�aCvEL i;a f:.vav'tCa AEYELv·(4) �v 
tt , f c · , � c " ' L ' � EV EO'tLV E1tLXE pnµa, EV� OE KVUOLV 01;L EL 1tOAAa EO'tL, xa� 
µEyaAa eoi;t xat µLxpa· µEyaAa µev WOTE anELpa 't'O µeyE&Os 
ELVaL, µLxpa OE OUTW<; WO'tE µn&tv EXELV µ£y£&or;.(5) EV on 
't'OU't� OECKVUOLV, O't'L ov µn't'E µEyE&or; µn't'E naxor; µn't'E oyxor; 
� c ' ' S:: ' " " .., I ' �. " " , µT')uE <; EO't'LV, OUo av £LT) 't'OU'tO. 1EL yup O:AA� OV'tL, �T)OL, 
npooytvoL'tO, OVOEV av µEt�ov noLnOELEV0 µEy£&ou<; yap µT')OEVO<; 
ov-co<;, npooyE voµ£vou 6£ ouoE: v o l 6v -CE £ lr; µ£yE&or; en L 6ouva 1.. 
t ti " " s:: ).. 6 ' s:: ). ,, ' S:: ). , xa ou'tw<; av T')uf) 'tu npooyLv µEvov ouu�v £LT). EL u� anoyLvo-
µ£vou 't'O E't'Epov µT')OEV EAd't't6V EO't'L, µT')OE ao npooy�voµ£vou 
o;u�noE'taL, 6nAOV O't'L 'CO npooy£v6µEVOV OUOEV �v ou6£ 'tO 
anoyevdµEvov."(6) xat -caui;a ouxt i;o �v avaLpwv 6 Znvwv 
AEYEL, aAA' O'tL µEyE&o<; EXEL EKaO�OV -r;wv 'JtOAAWV xat an£Cpwv 
�� npo �OU Aaµ�avoµ£vou a£C 't'L elvo:L OLU i;nv £n' anELpOV 
�oµnv·(?) 0 oeCxvuoL npooEC�a<; O�L OUOEV EXEL µEyE�O� EH 
�ov EHaa�ov �wv noAAwv eau�w �au�ov Elva� Kat £v.(8) 
I 
(1) We shall come back to this report about Zeno, 'Which clearly is at 
variance with Plato's definition of Zeno's intention. 
(2) The former sentence has no value as testimony, since Zeno knew 
nothing of the Aristotelian categories (to which the adjective 
12 
categorikos refers) and whether o r  not he was interested in "points," 
the stigme as here used goes back to Aristotle's exegesis of Zeno's 
argument in Metaphys. B4.100lb7-13. The second sentence, even if known 
to Eudemus from the same source, is nevertheless a reliable summary 
of Zeno-1a argument, which we shall discuss later when we have become 
acquainted with Zeno's own words and their context. 
(3) A half-hearted admission that Zeno may have attacked "the One" as well 
as "the many." 
(4) The familiar melody (S. here works his way back to the "orthodox" 
opinion) . 
(5) A summary of 29Bl D.-K. We shall study this fragment presently. 
(6) 
= 29B2. As Simplicius himself says, it formed part of the same fragment 
as 29Bl. It has for some time been included in the reconstruction of 
this fragment and we shall examine it when turning to the fragment. 
(7) We know that on the over-all theory to which Simplicius is committed, 
Zeno must on no account attack the One but on the contrary defend it. 
This must be borne in mind when we read the first clause. As exegesis 
of Zeno's text it is wrong; for as we shall see, Zeno does present an 
argument fatal for the hen--or some hen, to put the matter cautiously. 
If on the other hand Simplicius thinks of Zeno's ultimate purpose, 
the remaining part of this sentence is wrong, even though it sunnnarizes 
Zeno's next step in the argument ( see the reconstruction and discussion 
below). But in truth Zeno has more to say about ta pglla. That each 
of them has "size" is only one half of his argument; the other half 
of it leads to the opposite conclusion, and as Simplicius himself 
has assured us, Zeno's purpose was to show up contradictions involved 
in the assUl'llpti on that "the many area" 
(8) If we combine the content of this and the preceding assertion, the 
contradiction does emerge. But the preceding sentence remains mis-
leading and we shall find reasons for suspecting also this last 
sentence; for while it provides a context for Zeno's attack on the 
hen, Simplicius' wording renders this attack relatively harmless 
as being merely incidental in hiS exposure of' "the many." 
The reconstruction of Zeno's actual argument which follows, differs 
only in minor matters from H. Frankel and Furley (I follow the latter in 
marking the steps of the argument as a, b, c, d): 
a ) ( What was obviously more than one step is reported by Simplicius 
thus: ouo£v t�E 1. µtyE-&oc; (is shown Eli. 'tou) £xao"tov 'tWV rtoA.A.wv 
( - , ').. ., .., .. ECtU't� 'tCtU'tvV El.Val. 'Ka� EV. This must be resolved into two propositions 
which as soon as they are formulated suggest that something is missing be­
tween them: al) EJ.<.aai;ov 'tWV noA.A.wv Eau't£ti 'tCXU'tOV Ka't EV, 
a2) ouoE v EXEL µE'yE-&oc; (139.18-19). 
b) (Beginning again with Simplicius' words: oo IJ.Tl'tE µE'ye:.&o<; µn'tE 
L ../.. " c '  ) ' "  " .L 1taXO<; µ.,'tE oyKO<; µf)3E <; EO'tLV EL CtAA� OV'tL rtpoay�VOL'tO, 
OUOEV av µEt�ov TtOLTlOELEV· µEy£3ouc; yap µnoe:voc; OV'tO<;, 
npoaye:voµE'vou 6£, ouo£v ol6v 'tE Elc; µE'ye:3oc; l n 1. oouva1. . xa't 
OU'tW<; liv 11011 'tO npoay1.v6µe:vov ouotv e:i11.(lacuna?)El OE O:noyi.vo­
µE'vou 'tO E'tEpov µf)OEV EACt't'tOV EO'taL, µnot av npoay1.voµ£vou 
au�� OE't aL , 6�A.ov O'tL �o npoayEv6µEVOV OUOEV �v OUOE -ro ano­
ye:v6µe:vov. (Simpl. 1.39, 11-15; hence) e:l µT) £xo1. µ£ye:&oc; -ro Bv, 
' .t.' " ,, ( ) OUu av E LT) �. 141.lf • •  
c) El oe £a't1.v, &v&yKTJ EKaa'to v µ£ye:&6c; -ri. EXELV Kat n&xoc; 
Kat &n£xe: 1. v aU'tOU 'tO E �Epov ano 'tOU £-r£pou. Ka't nEpL 'tOU 
np o 6xov'toc; 6 au'to<; A.6yoc;. Ka't y�p lxe:Ivo E�EL µ£ye:&6� xat 
npoE� E L aO'tOU 'tL. 0µ01.ov on -rou�o ana� -rE e:lne:tv xat aEt 
A.tye:i. v · OUOEV yap ClU'tOU 'tOLOU'tOV Eaxa-rov ta't aL ov-rE E'tEpOV 
npoc; E 't e:pov ouK £a-ra 1. (ibid . 141.1-6). 
d) O�'tW<; El TIOAAa la'tLV, av&yKT) au-ra µLKp& -re: ElvaL Kat 
µe:yaA.a , µ1.xpa µev wa-rE µn EXELV µE'yE3oc;, µe:yaA.a OE WO'tE 
an£ L pa EL VCl L (lliS_., 6-8) • 
�� feel free to ignore some uncertainties about details of this 
reconstruction, nor shall we go into debate about the difficult text in 
c ) , since no matter how these sentences are interpreted�whether Frankel's 
(A1 J, Ph. 63, 1942, 14ff,, re-edited in Wege lm.d Forman frtihgriech. 
Denkens) or Vlastos' (G1omon 31, 1959, 195ff . ) exegesis is preferred, ou:r 
problem is not affected, To put this problem bluntly, does Zeno in the 
course of his reasoning discredit the One as well as the Many, and are 
both objectives of equal concern to him? Or is what he says against the 
One merely a stepping stone on the way to his true and sole objective, 
the refutation of the Many? We have to take the latter view if in the 
conclusion as formulated ind) the clause µi..xpa µEv WO'tE µT) exe: i..v 
' 
. 
µtye:-&o� rests on a, not on e. For if this is the case, the entire 
sequence a)-d) would deal with "the many" and would bring "opposites" 
about them to light. More specifically, a) and b) would show that they 
are "small" and in the end of "no size" at all, c) would prove them to be 
large, and d) would pull the opposites together. This understanding of 
the entire argument seems to be s uggested by the last sentences of 
Simplicius in the section just examined. It would be in accord with 
Plato's "testimony" in the Parmenides and it has been championed in 
recent decades by Calogero, Frankel, Vlastos, Booth, and Furley, a 
formidable array of authorities. Although most of them accept Plato's 
testimony, they do not support thei r  interpretation of the fragment by 
invoking Plato's authoritr but by specific arguments, which we shall 
forthwith examine. To anticipate the result of this examination, it is 
not possible to prove or to refute either of the two theories conclusively, 
but for the opinion of Alexander and Eudemus that for Zeno µrioE: v 'tWV 
,, � tt OV'tWV 'tu e v --the opinion which Simplicius is so desperately anxious 
to refut e�more than is commonly admitted can be said, and it would be 
well to give the arguments in favor of it a readier hearing. 
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One reason why anyone might hesitate to find for "so small as to have 
no size" in d) a basis in the i:mmediately preceding sentence of c) is that 
while it is easy and perfectly correct to envisage the parts emerging in 
c) as becoming small and progressively smaller, they yet will never reach 
the nil magnitude, as Zeno himself seems to recognize by ruling out an 
eschaton. Surely if Zeno almost immediately after affirming this1spoke of 
11no size" as final result, he committed what Vlastos has rightly called 
a "logical gaffe." On the other hand "no size " is reached in a), but 
how? All we know is that "self-identity" and "one" were way stations. 
While there is no evidence as to how Zeno went from "one" to "no size" 
and the best hypothesis is to posit the "indivisibility" of the one as 
the link, other ways too are conceivable, but how could smallness figure 
in this argument? Yet the " gaffe" of which Zeno is guilty if in passing 
from c) to d ) he allowed smallness to end in "no size" is somehow balanced 
by the other gaffe which he by general consensus committed by allowing 
the megethos of c), which becomes bigger and bigger only in relati on to 
the emerging subdivisions, to end as "infinity." There is a certain 
symmetry about these two logical errors, and the reader will not fail 
to perceive this symmetry in Zeno's actual phrasing, when in his first 
conclusion he contents himself with "large" and "small"-both correctly 
deducible from c)-and then carries both of them to extremes, neither 
of which is any longer legitimate. Thus serious mistakes are present on 
either of the two possible interpretations. Less serious may be another 
point. Unless Simplicius misleads us completely, ov6ev f:xe:t. µ.tye:.S.o<; 
in a2 ) must mean "nothing has size." This is not the same as the con­
clusion formulated ind ) , where "no size" is by no means asserted of all 
l2.,0lla�or if it is asserted, this would be one more gaffe; it surely is 
more charitable to understand Zeno here as allowing entities to be large 
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and small and introducing 11no size" as ail ext reme of "small" (we need not 
ask of what it is predicated; presumably any such item would ce ase to 
"be"). Who likes may notice that while Zeno's actual text ind) expresses 
"no size" by me ,megethos' Simplicius I report renders this point (in the 
sentence before ; ) by meden,megetho§, a trifling inaccuracy no doubt, and 
yet it results in increas:ing the similarity between this clause in d) 
and the words ouden.megethos in his paraphrase of a) at the very end of 
the section we have presented. 
Small and of little weight as this observation is, it yet may serve 
as a warning against delivering ourselves too readily into the hands of 
Simplicius. This has some bearing on the next question I wish to raise. 
According to Simplicius in the section copied above Zeno showed in a) 
that "each of the many" is identica,l with itself, is one and has no size 
( even if for the la.st proposition he changed his phrasing slightlyf while 
in c) he showed that "each of the many has size." ·Following closely upon 
one another, the se two items in his report favor or even suggest the 
interpretation of the entire fragment which contemporary scholars have 
adopted. The symmetry makes this interpretation almost inevitable, 
especially since in both sentences we find the words hekaston ton poll�. 
Still the symmetry may only be apparent. We have Zeno's own text only 
for c), not for a ) and when looking at c ) we find in it t he word hekaston 
�ut not ton pollon. Thinking that they were germane to Zeno's meaning, 
Simplicius may have extracted the se two words from d ) ; yet whatever 
prompted him, it would surely be rash if on his authority we as sumed the 
words hekaston ton poll9n actually to occur in a). Whether or not Zeno 
spoke of "the many" in a) must remain an open question. An affinnetive 
answer has been given so far on the basis of Simplicius' report, probably 
1. Therefore Herm.. Frankel, loc, oit. 15 and 17n.46 has transferred 
the words so as to place hekaston ton poll�n immediately a�er megethos. 
This makes the symmetry perfect, 
_ 
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as combined with Plat o ' s testimony in the Parmenides. Are there really 
no alternatives? Too little attention is paid by Simplicius and by and 
18.rge also by modern scholars to b) and the opening words of c). They 
show a considerable concern with einai. The argument by which in b) 
what has no siz e is ruled out of existence is decidedly elaborate, and 
as soon as � is reintroduced at the beginning of c ) we evidently 
find ourselves on a new basi s for the ensuing argumentation. Thus it would 
�exempli gratia�be conceivable that Zeno's entire argument, focusing on 
"being and what is" would begin by proving whatever "is" to be "one," 
then argue the "one"--or, perhaps more correctly, whatever is "one11-out 
of existence, next since 'tO ov ouo' av E i11 would seem intolerable, 
c) would begin by positing the opposite of what proved fatal in a) and 
b), would investigate the new position, and in the end in d) we would find 
ourselves once more deadlocked, since if being is "many," there would 
emerge the typical contradictions. Actually Zeno would on this hypothes�s 
have practiced his habitual demonstration of ta enantia not only for 
"the ma.ny" but he would in a more comprehensive manner have proved first 
the assumption of a "one" to be impossible and then meted out the same 
fate to the assumption of the polla ( or, more exactly of the existence 
of ta poJ.la; for as I wish to suggest, einai and .sm are important through­
out the argument ) . I do not at all maintain that the reconstruction here 
attempted must be correct; still less do I Wish to di scourage other 
attempts. On the contrary I should encourage them; for while none may 
be cogent, the thesis which so far has enjoyed a monopoly, scil. that from 
the first word to the last Zeno's concern is with "the manyt1 ought to be 
put to a more severe test. It may be true but it is dangerous to take 
its truth for granted. 
Another difficulty for the prevailing interpretation of this fragment 
may be found in a passage of Simplicius separated by barely a page from 
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that quoted in full above. Here (in Phzs. 14i.lff . ; esp .. 9ff.) Simplicius' 
immediate obJective is to prove Zeno's use of "dichotomy." To establish 
his point he quotes two arguments by 'Which Zeno proved the "quantitative 
infinite" in the sense of an infinite mult5.tude arising in the progress 
of division. Having adduced BJ he proceeds to the argument which engages 
us. His first words are npo&E:C�ac; yap O'tl. "El µfi exo1. µlyE-&o<;; 'to 
"' 
's:.' 
"' ' L t ov ouu E LTJ", E1tcx.YE L. Now follows wha Zeno epagei, namely the 
text of c) and d ) as copied by us above. After :finishing the quotation 
Simplicius feels moved once more to protest against Alexander•s allegation 
that Zeno wished to refute the i'One." His real purpose was to "strengthen 
Parmenides doctrine" about the One and to refute "the many" through "the 
contradictions which arise for those positing them" ('tit' 'tcXVO:V't' Ca 
ouµ�a C VE L v 'tot' c; uno't 1.-0-E µ£ vo 1. c;). We naturally wonder where such 
a contradiction here materializes. Ob'Yiously it is formulated in d) 
but does c) alone this time suffice as basis for the conclusion dra'W'Il 
in d )? � inclination would be to think so. As an alternative we might 
suppose that Zeno being primarily concerned with the subject of dichot� 
allows himself some carelessness in the matter of "the contradictions." 
Also a friendly critic has suggested to me that the words introduced by 
prodeixa� should be taken into consideration and that combined with c) 
they would produce the contradiction. Consideration should certainly be 
given to this possibility, even though without this brief introduction 
the first three words of c) would be difficult to understand and this 
may be the reason why Simplicius provides the introduction. Moreover 
worded as it is, the introduction would hardly furnish the best basis for 
"small so as to have no size" in d), for a�rt from referring to iQ..jm, 
�ot to "the many," it takes "no size" for granted and acquaints us with 
some dire consequences of this condition. What Simplicius reports two 
pages earlier and what for us.is a), sc11. "nothing has size" because 
::;Jp:¢
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"eaeh of the many is ••• one" would se�m to prepare this clause ind ) bettere 
Still it niay not be for us to advise Simplicius about the most effective 
procedure. 
Thus while the prevailing interpretation of the entire fragment from 
a) to d ) cannot claim to hold all trump cards and a good deal may be said 
in favor of other approaches, certainty eludes us.. St:i.11 no matter whether 
whether Zeno in the first half of the fragment made it his object to 
invalidate the hen and in the second ta poll§. or whether his objective 
remained from the beginning to the end to show the contradictions inherent 
in ta polla, a serious problem remains. For on either assumption the hen 
is attacked and shown to be nothing (or not to "be"). Now who wishes may 
boldly discount Eudemus• statement about Zeno's ignorance and aporia 
concerning the hen, since Eudemus reports from hearsay and may have mis­
understood something. We may similarly dismiss Plato's testimony in the 
fitaedrus ( 26ld6 ff . l:Q • .  Tov oov 'EA.e:a't1.Kov Dai\o:µfi6riv A.f.yovi;a. ovH 
iaµe:v 'tEXV't]t won; cpo:Cve:o-8-ai. 'tO!� aKOVOUOI. 'tCx O:U'tCx 0µ01.a Kat 
&:v6µ01.o:, Kat Ev Kat noA.A.a, µitvov-r;a i;e: <'.XO Kat cpe:p6µe:va) as re­
flecting only "impressions" of the audience. The reasoning against the 
hen in our fragment cannot be disputed away, and whether or not it was 
merely a step on the way to something more important, it is difficult to 
explain if Zeno wrote his treatise to defend the h.§1! of Parmenides. Booth 
in his paper ( Phronesis 3, cited on our first pages) has drawn attention 
•• 
to this embarrassing problem. The only escape from the embarrassment is 
to insist on a fundamental difference between this hen and the all embracing, 
solitary b!D of Parmenides. Yet even on thi.s hypothesis, hCM odd would 
it be that Zeno in his polemic against ta polla should di s credit a � 
and prove its non-existence? His readers may in any case have been 
baffled; by this turn he would gratuitously increase their confusion. 
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For how would people who had no schooling in the ppsachoslegetai distinguish 
one hen from the other? How would they realize that if this hen and ta 
poll� are discredited, the only truth left is the (alleged) Pa:rmenidean 
conception of the �. Or that if any megethos qua syneches is divisible 
ad infinitum, they must conceive a � which (for the reasons stated by 
Pa:rmenides in BS.22-5) is at the same time syneohes and adiaireton? And, 
to continue in this vein, how were they from Zeno's analysis of movement 
and the difficulties he discovered in it to proceed in their minds to the 
concept of ajdheton (cf. Parm. BS.26, 38) as essential for the One? Or 
from the difficulties of � and of being in a � arrive at the idea 
of something-presumably again the On�-resting in the same plaee and by 
-or in-itself (BS.29)? In the words of another Platonic dialogue 
(Ch�rm. 169alr.) µe:yaA.ou of) ·nvo<;, aJ cpO .. e:, &:vopot; oe:t, OO''tL<; 
'tOV'tO Ka'ta navi;wv LKavwc; OLaLp � cre:�aL. 
But perhaps our disquisitions and worries are unnecessary. Plato 
himself provides the solution; for as we have seen, Socrates and Zeno 
agree (diff'ering only on a minor aspect of the matter) in admitting the 
difficult and deceptive quality of Zeno's treatiseo To penetrate to Zeno's 
trµe meaning and realize the basic ide�tity of his and Parmenides' position 
is, Socrates says, "above us others" ( 128b5f . ) . Are we then to suppose 
that most readers being puz zled by the arguments were perhaps entertained 
or spellbound but unable to see the intention behind all of them--until 
Plato apJ�ared, playing in this instance the role of the meg1s aner being 
capable of distinguishing and analyzing what had proved too much for others? 
An alternative explanation would be that, discounting the anecdotieal 
embroidery of�. 128d6ff. we think of the treatise as originally com­
posed for a group of faithful Pa.rmenideans whom the identical intention 
of all refutations and pa�adoxes would not escape. 
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Whatever the solution, acceptance of Plato's testimony in the 
�armenj,del raises more problems than has eonnnonly been realized$ In spite 
of these problems Plato's divinatio may yet have hit the truth but to have 
this confidence involves an act of faith. If anyone wonders what other 
theory we�with our very limited means--may put forward r�garding Zeno•s 
treatise, he may take notice of the fact that in the Phaedrus Plato mentions 
Zeno not in the compaJlY' of other philosophers but of rhetoricians like 
Thrasymachus, The9C1orus and Gorgias . We instinctively rebel aga�nst finding 
him classed with men whose ambition was to est�blish a hold on people's 
minds by dazzling them, swaying them, and if necessary even deceiving them; 
for we are wont to consider Zeno a thinker of high order am originality 
whose discoveries �ave been called immeasurably profound and whose problems 
and diletnmas deeply influenced the subsequent dev�1opments of philosophy. 
Still, granting �11 o� this and admitting also that Plato in the Parmenides 
had every right to wonder about the "intention" of Zeno's treatise--for 
whatever is "Written reflects some kind of intention on the part of its 
author-Plato may yet prejudice the inquiry by expecting the intention to 
relate to a definite philosophical position and by insisting that the con­
clusions of all individual arguments converged in this direction. Zeno, to 
judge from what little we know, seems to delight in intellectual experimen­
tation, in the discovery and exploitation of new argu:rnentative methods. 
Problems, dilemmas, paradoxes, equally defensible alternatives may have 
fascinated him more for their own sake than for that of a resolution and 
positive "results." In the devising of new methods am argumentative 
techniques he remains a pioneer ; here lies his main achievement. That for 
th� application of this unique gift he found a fertile ground in the con­
tempora.ry philosophical situation, or to 'be specific, in Parmenides' 
challenge t9 all earlier physikoi would be natural even if Elea had not been 
hts·city and if critical reactions to Pa?'Jllenides had not kept the issues alivee 
... 
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The discovery of infinite divisibility a.lone opened up possibilities 
. . 
as inexhaustible in their application as were the increasingly smaller 
segments brought to light by every operation 'l>ihich employed this new 
idea... Should all use that Zeno himself made of' it have served one and 
the same end? Must even the question about the millet seeds, allegedly 
addressed to Protagoras, be constrilcted as a support of Parmenides? 
Zeno, I repeat, gives the impression of havin� enjoyed the game. If it 
had serious implications, so mu.ch the better., He may well head the long 
line of those who professed themselves able to present two mutually · 
contradictory logoi
.
on every subject (even though we do not in every 
· · inst,S.nce know his second answer and he may indeed sometimes have thought 
one startling answer sufficient ) ., 
After all this has been said, it still :remains possible-but no more 
than possible-that he readily placed all resources of his inventivness· 
. . 
· at the service of Parmenides' thesis. He may have done· so because he was 
. . 
honestly convin.ced of its truth or because it was attractive to defend 
something that went against co:mmon sense alla. everybody's natural inclina­
tiono Who after twenty four centuries and on the basis of what little 
we know may ve�ture to .define his motivation? And 'Who can even assure 
us that the true explanation of the impulse behind his intellectual 
·adventures may not elude us altogether? 
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